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Saturday, August 22, 2026
KAJ NEWSCYBER · PRIVACY · SECURITY

CVE-2026-74556

The CVE Severity Digest turns the National Vulnerability Database feed into a prioritized security briefing. It groups affected software into practical product families, distinguishes patch and mitigation references from general citations, and ranks the vulnerabilities most likely to matter to technology operators while preserving direct links to the official record.

Records
199
Last changed
Update schedule
17 6 * * * UTC
Coverage
08/15/2026–08/22/2026
Method
Methodology
CVE
CVE-2026-74556
Description
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: scsi: libiscsi_tcp: Bound SCSI Response data segment to the connection buffer iscsi_tcp_hdr_dissect() receives the data segment of several PDU types into the fixed-size conn->data buffer, which is allocated for ISCSI_DEF_MAX_RECV_SEG_LEN (8192) bytes. For the LOGIN_RSP, TEXT_RSP, REJECT and ASYNC_EVENT opcodes the dissect path already rejects a PDU whose DataSegmentLength exceeds that buffer. The SCSI Command Response (ISCSI_OP_SCSI_CMD_RSP) path also copies its data segment (sense/response data) into conn->data via iscsi_tcp_data_recv_prep(), but it does so without the same check. The only upstream bound on in.datalen is conn->max_recv_dlength, the initiator's advertised MaxRecvDataSegmentLength, which is commonly negotiated well above 8192 (open-iscsi defaults to 262144). A target that returns a SCSI Response with a DataSegmentLength between 8193 and max_recv_dlength therefore overflows the 8192-byte conn->data buffer. Once the same bound applies, ISCSI_OP_SCSI_CMD_RSP is handled exactly like those responses: bound the data segment, receive it into conn->data when present, and otherwise complete the PDU with no data. Fold the opcode into that case group rather than duplicating the check.
Published
08/15/2026
Severity
UNKNOWN
CVSS
Priority score
19.952